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Position of Gomulka in PZPR (Communist Party) / Strength of old Communist elements re: former Socialist Party elements / Attitudes of Polish youth

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a report on the domestic political situation in Poland,

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SITUATION IN POLAND

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1. GOMULKA personal position inside the United Workers party:

From the point of view of his past, GOMULKA is [redacted], rather disciple of the Polish Socialist party (PPS) than of the Communists. He came to the Communist ranks from Socialist organisation, and, from the point of view of political education, had been greatly influenced, as a young man, by patriotic Polish traditions of Socialist movement.

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During the last Socialist party (PPS) Congress in Wroclaw, in 1947, GOMULKA, speaking about the possibility of merger between the Socialist party (PPS) and the Communists (Polish Workers party-PPR), emphasized that this merger should assure for the future unified working class party Socialist leadership as far as ideological line is concerned. GOMULKA was at that time still Secretary General of the Polish Workers party, and these opinions impressed very much many Socialists.

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[redacted], it was quite obvious that GOMULKA considered Socialist ideological leadership as antidote to the Moscow sponsored current of pro-Russian Communists, already in strength in Polish Workers party ranks.

Therefore, the present GOMULKA stand and his efforts to liberate Poland (and the United Workers party) from Russian interference is conform to his attitude taken during the first years after the war.

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As far as the present internal situation of the United Workers party is concerned, [redacted] it is necessary to bear well in mind the weakness of the so-called GOMULKA group. GOMULKA is almost alone, and those who are called at present his close collaborators, betrayed him in the past in the most cases. During the unification Congress (merger between the Communist and Socialist parties) in 1948 many men who are at present around GOMULKA took stand against him. This was the case of Gen. SPYCHAJSKI (present Minister of National Defense) or Zenon KLISZKO, f.ex. They "learned" subsequently, through their own imprisonment, what the Moscow sponsored Communist rule means, but they had shown in the past to be weak men, opportunists.

GOMULKA must rely on the non-Communist (former Socialist) elements, or political currents outside of the United Workers party. He has still backing of the Polish public opinion considering him as a man who had given initiative for liberation of Poland from the Russian interference. But as far as former Communist elements are concerned, the pro-Moscow group is far stronger as the Gomulkists, and is still controlling great part of the United Workers party bureaucratic apparatus. Example of Warsaw organisation may be quoted: till present GOMULKA did not succeed to get control over the United Workers party apparatus in the town of Warsaw and in [redacted] of Warsaw. Even recently GOMULKA statements had been contradicted by the old line representatives.

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The former Communist elements know well that they are unpopular in Poland. They can not afford to attack openly GOMULKA or to oust him, because of fear of popular uprising. But they are hampering his ef-

fort to push democratisation and force him to compromise, using Russian intervention blackmail. In result, GOMULKA's popularity in Poland declined undoubtedly since October 1956. Recently, there were many cases that during workers meetings of the party in provinces GOMULKA was openly criticised in his own presence, because of failing to satisfy hopes connected with the so-called Polish "October revolution" of 1956.

Till present, however, there are no signs that GOMULKA would be disposed to yield under the pressure of pro-Moscow elements.

The party Congress is scheduled for December 1957. But in Gomulkaist circles opinions had been expressed openly that the Congress will take place only in the case there will be certainty that the pro-Moscow group can not get majority, using pressures of its partisans in party bureaucratic apparatus.

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[redacted] so-called "revisionnist" current inside the United Workers party, [redacted] is popular among the younger members, university youth first of all, but its effective weight from the point of view of party internal situation should be considered rather insignificant.

In these circumstances, GOMULKA is forced in many cases to compromise. These tactics are dangerous because the public opinion is becoming more and more restless.

2. The problem of former Socialist (PPS) elements:

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[redacted], the former Communist (PPR) elements had shown already their incapacity to sponsor any kind of new party program. These elements, held justly responsible for the past policy of the "old régime", are completely compromised in public opinion, even among the mass of workers.

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Therefore, unless the pro-Moscow group will succeed to get control [redacted]

[redacted] the further process of disintegration of the United Workers party is inevitable. GOMULKA group is too weak to take full leadership. Therefore, the Socialist elements are in some way the only possible successors of the present Communist leadership.

These elements gained a lot of ground more recently. The syndical movement (trade-unions) are practically in Socialist hands. Inside the United Workers party, the ~~same~~ former Socialists get hold of a number of important posts in the party organisation. A number of voievodies is already in their hands.

The question if the Socialist party (PPS) should be reconstructed or not is left for the future, and depends on the developments inside the United Workers party. But, in fact, Socialist organisations are in full revival. Meetings of former Socialist party members became ~~very~~ ^{common} phenomenon.

The Communist elements are aware of danger. Efforts had been made to force a number of former Socialists to subscribe some kind of declaration that they will remain faithful to the United Workers party. A declaration of this kind had been signed by a dozen of minor lea-

ders (minor from the point of view of Socialist ranks-some of them are occupying important posts in the United Workers party, some Ministers were among them), but they had afterwards to withdraw from their stand and offer explanations on a meeting of former Socialist party members in Warsaw, last Spring

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This revival of Socialist force in Poland is most important phenomenon, especially in view of revival of the Peasant movement, too.

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The Western propaganda may have great influence on the process of revival of Socialism in Poland.

The Communists and Moscow are trying even at present to convince everybody that the Socialist movement in the West is practically dead, and only Communists remained as leading force of the working class. The foreign broadcastings, like Voice of America or Radio Free Europe, are giving too little about the Socialism in the West. The problems like activity of non-Communist trade-unions, political action of Socialists in different countries, should be introduced in the programs at great extend. It is necessary to show that Moscow is not the only place where there is (or pretends to be) realisation of Socialist principles.

The problems like Labour party stand, French Socialists or unification of Italian Socialists, are of great propaganda importance for the Socialists in all "Satellite" countries, trying to reconstruct their ranks.

The Western Socialism formulas are the best antidotum to Moscow sponsored propaganda of Socialism made in Russia.

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As far as Poland is concerned, this problem should be considered as a crucial one. He expressed the opinion that the Polish working class will never abandon principle of social ownership of big industrial enterprises. The hatred of everything Russian is extremely strong (he used the expression that this hatred takes form of some pathological state of mind). It is necessary to show to the Polish working class that the West is able to offer its own Socialist formula, formula of freedom.

3. The youth problem:

The new régime created after the war had some popularity among youth originated from working class or peasantry, because they got possibility to go to universities and polytechnical schools, and make career.

KHRUSHCHEV's speech on the XX Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, distributed in Poland almost immediately after the Congress (it is question of speech pronounced on the secret meeting, not official report) provoked extremely violent reaction and moral crisis. The confidence in the new Communist régime had fallen in pieces. In result it could be observed some kind of anti-ideological stand, wave of pessimism and tendency almost to anarchy. The Communist education was superficial and operated with ready formulas lacking in fact any substantial meaning, but very attractive from the point of view of external form. Once the confidence in these formulas had been destroyed, all the education had

fallen to pieces. The old régime destroyed libraries "epurating" books contrary to the Moscow line. Therefore the young generation had little intellectual preparation, lack of knowledge of the West; but all that produced even stronger reaction against the old régime, in result.

The Soviets made big effort to russify the younger generation, operating with the same system Tzarist régime did at the time. F.ex. towards the end of 1955 Moscow prepared hand-book of Polish history for Polish schools, considering that the Poles did not sufficiently "epurate" their own history. This hand-book was worse than the famous hand-book of ILOVAYSKI used before the I World war. Even POLITBUREAU headed by BIERUT did not dare to translate it in Polish, and ordered some Polish professors to elaborate independent Polish version.

The present Minister of National Education BIENKOWSKI is doing well suppressing all this party literature and giving back to the schools liberty of teaching. All old hand-books are gradually replaced by adequate manuals. This will make possible to save the Polish youth from total degeneration.

As far as the United Workers party is concerned, great part of younger generation had been educated ~~in~~ after the war in Socialist organisation called OMTUR (ORGANIZACJA MŁODZIEŻY TOWARZYSTWA UNIWEKSYTE-TOW ROBOTNICZYCH - Youth Organisation of Workers Universities Association, organisation which existed before the war and was reconstructed in 1944-45 under the sponsorship of the Prime Minister OSOBA-MORAWSKI, Socialist).

After the merger with Communists in 1948, OMTUR was liquidated and Communist Union of Youth (ZMP) took its place. But to-day great part of younger United Workers party members are disciples of OMTUR. They are Socialists, not Communists, and their influence is growing.

Another factor of regeneration of youth is newly reconstructed Boy-Scouts organisation.

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4. Residue of the "old régime", political police:

Notwithstanding changes which took place after October 1956 the so-called Moscow group of the United Workers party is still controlling great part of party bureaucracy and some sectors of Governmental administration. One of the most typical examples is the continuation of activity of censure of books or papers. Obstacles are still put as far as penetration of Western literature is concerned. This old apparatus is frightened by any perspective of changes, because they know well that they will lose their posts.

The political police (UB) was completely disbanded under enormous pressure of the public opinion. The crimes of the police are universally known. In many places "private" cemeteries of victims of political

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police were discovered.

There are still many "old" elements even in the present Ministry of Interior. But they can not, even if they wish, reconstruct the old police under the new form, because of fear of strong popular reaction. At present, the control over internal situation is entrusted to the Political Department of the Ministry of Interior. This Department has at its disposal a small force of secret police, besides Militia, official police. But this new secret police is extremely weak, and unable to exercise terror the old Security police did.

5. General remarks about internal situation:

^{no} Economic situation is almost decisive factor as far as further developments are concerned. The Western help is essential for Poland to keep independence from Russia.

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The situation is particularly tense in towns and industrial centres. The peasantry got already great advantages from the new policy, but the working class, which backed GOMULKA, is becoming more and more restless because of lack of greater improvement of living conditions.

[redacted] hearts are still for GOMULKA, but stomachs are asking louder and louder for their rights, too.

The hatred ~~taxes~~ against Russians and the Communism, considered as Russian product, is such that even a spark may produce great fire. This is some guarantee against any attempt to go back to the old régime. But at the same time there is danger that GOMULKA cautious tactics (see above reasons of this [redacted]) are increasing discontentment and tension.

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6. Remarks about the Russians:

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[redacted] in many occasions the Russians asked [redacted] "when such changes as in Poland will take place in the Soviet Union". These remarks are heard however only at the lower level of the party, or from non-party men.

The Communist party as such is apparently not popular in Russia. The army has some popularity only because it is considered by the mass of population as something "different" from the present Communist régime led by the party.

Russian Communism seems to have more and more imperialistic character and almost follows the patterns of the old Pan Slavistic formulas used by Russian imperialism under Empire.

There is great danger of Russian reactions as far as Polish developments are concerned: Poland became, especially since October 1956, destructive factor of Soviet régime and present Soviet empire in Europe.

7. German problem:

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important. The question of the present frontier is considered as the most